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AN INSURANCE STRUCTURE TO ENCOURAGE
INVESTMENT IN PREVENTIVE HEALTH CARE
Nicholas Georgakopoulos*
The incentives for investments in Americans' health are poorly aligned. Health
insurers are not sufficiently motivated to invest for the long term. The structure of
health insurance does not compensate insurers for investments in lasting health,
such as measures preventing chronic disease. If an American changes insurers, the
new insurer reaps the benefits of the good health the prior insurer's investment
produced.
This Essay explores insurers' incentives to invest in health, illustrates how those
incentives fail, explores possible improvements, and shows that subsequent insurers
should have an obligation to compensate the prior insurer for the averted expenses
of expected diseases that did not emerge. This gives insurers the full incentive to
prevent chronic disease while strengthening the incentives to develop cures.
INTRODUCTION
A good example of the failure that this essay addresses is gastric
bypass surgery. This surgery dramatically reduces the complications
from obesity, including the risk of diabetes. The procedure costs
about $23,000 and produces monetized annual benefits of about
$4,000, making it clearly desirable.' However, insurers only started
covering it when medical boards approved it, and insurers still do
not have the incentive to be the first movers in recommending the
* Harold R. Woodard Professor of Law, Robert H. McKinney School of Law, Indiana
University, Indianapolis. I wish to thank Eric Dannenmeier, Jennifer Drobac, Rob Katz,
Eleanor Kinney, Antony Page, Mike Pitts, and Margaret Tarkington for their helpful
comments, the exceptional assistance of librarian Susan deMaine, and the excellent research
assistance of Mark Harbin. I invite you to send your comments to me at ngeorgak@iu.edu.
1. See Ronen Avraham & K.A.D. Camara, The Tragedy of the Human Commons, 29 CAR-
Dozo L. REv. 479, 489, 499 (2007) (cost of $25,000, annual benefits of $5,000); see also Pierre-
Yves Crhmieux et al., A Study on the Economic Impact of Bariatric Surgery, 14 Am. J. MANAG. CARE
589, 592 (2008) (reporting that insurers recover within four years from savings the approxi-
mate $26,000 cost of bariatric surgery, and recover within two years the approximate $17,000
cost of laparoscopic bariatric surgery, suggesting annual benefits of well over $6,000); Gerry
Oster et al., Lifetime Health and Economic Benefits of Weight Loss Among Obese Persons, 89 Am. J.
PUB. HEALTH 1536, 1540 (1999) (lowest estimate of annual benefits is $3,300 to $3,800);
Denise Mann, Gastric Bypass Surgery Cost, CONSUMER GUIDE TO BARIATRIC SURGERY, http://
www.yourbariatricsurgeryguide.com/gastric-bypass-cost/ (last visited Feb. 29, 2012) (cost
ranges from $18,000 to $35,000); Weight-Control Information Network, NAT'L INST. OF DIABETES
& DIGESTIVE & KIDNEY DISEASES, http://win.niddk.nih.gov/publications/gastric.htm (last vis-
ited Feb. 29, 2012) ("Bariatric procedures, on average, cost from $20,000 to $25,000.").
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surgery to insured individuals. Insurers do not have the appropriate
incentive because the insured may change insurers, giving to the
subsequent insurer the reduction in claims and the insured's good
health caused by the surgery. This example fits all costly procedures
that produce enduring health benefits.
The theoretically optimal decision on healthcare would be the
one taken by a fully informed, solvent, and self-insured individual.
Health insurance shifts some of the risk to the insurer. The result is
that an average individual, already insufficiently informed, also
loses significant financial motivation to make the correct decision.
Other insurance contracts transfer the insured's lost financial moti-
vation for care to the insurer. Insurers of property, for example,
bear the cost of its destruction and therefore have the incentive to
prevent harm.
But this is not true in health insurance. The turnover of health
insurers means that their incentives are woefully shortsighted.2 For
a health insurer, a chronic disease imposes costs of care only until
the patient switches insurers. The motivators of healthcare demand
and cost-benefit calculations remain professional boards (that es-
tablish what treatments are appropriate) and insured individuals.
Neither group has the full economic incentives of its decisions. This
Essay seeks to strengthen the insurers' incentives and align them
with those of the insured. The current environment of healthcare
reform offers a unique opportunity to improve incentives in health
insuranceA
The contribution of this Essay is a proposal for improving the
incentive structure of health insurance. The proposed reform
would give insurers, including employers that self-insure through
ERISA plans, 4 stronger incentives for preventing chronic disease
2. Anecdotal reports place the duration of insurance contracts at three to five years.
See, e.g., Erica Worth Harris, The Regulation of Managed Care: Conquering Individualism and Cyni-
cism in America, 6 VA.J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 315, 364 (1999) ("[W]hether because an employer
changes managed care plans or because employees change jobs, the average person changes
health care plans once every three years."); Jennifer M. Yeh et al., A Refined Estimate of the
Average Lifetime Cost of Pelvic Inflammatory Disease, 30 SEXuA.LLY TRANSmITri DisEASSES 369, 376
(2003) ("[T]he average person changes healthcare plans every 3 to 5 years.").
3. For the current status of health care reform in the United States, see Patient Protec-
tion and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (PPACA), Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (codified
at scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.), amended by Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act
of 2010, Pub. L, No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (codified at scattered sections of 20, 26, and 42
U.S.C.). The constitutionality of the PPACA's most important provisions was upheld in Nat'l
Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
4. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat.
829 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002-1461 (2006)), gives employers the option to
self-insure (i.e., pay directly the medical expenses of their employees instead of buying health
insurance). The statute provides that "'welfare plan' mean [s] any , . . program . . . by an
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among their insured. By advocating for insurer responsibility, the
proposal partly resolves the conundrum identified by prior articles
that have noted that increased patient responsibility could consti-
tute an improvement but entails dangers. 5 Also, this Essay differs
from arguments giving patients the incentive to take precautions,
such as allocating resources by a measure of preventive care. 6 Such
approaches would have drawbacks similar to those of increased pa-
tient responsibility. The proposal here has similarities to the idea of
a clearinghouse of insurers, which was proposed to give insurers the
incentive to cover procedures with long-term benefits.7 The propo-
sal does not call for any new infrastructure. Rather, by utilizing the
infrastructure of the current insurance scheme, the proposal is
more immediately realizable than previous proposals.8
I. INSURANCE INCENTIVES AND CHRONIC DISEASE
Insurance coverage is a marvel of economic creativity and a well-
spring of value-profit for the insurer and security for the insured.
The insurer agrees to shoulder a specified risk under specified con-
ditions, relieving the insured from significant costs of the risk. To
the insured, the value of avoiding the debilitative consequences of a
risk can be enormous. The insurer extracts a profit by pooling the
risks of numerous insured, diversifying the risk, and satisfying the
claims of the unfortunate few from the premiums that all the in-
sured pay.
The incentives surrounding the insurance relation are complex.
The principal changes of conduct that insurance tends to cause are
categorized as expressions of two phenomena: moral hazard and
adverse selection.
employer ... [providing) through the purchase of insurance or otherwise . . . medical
[care] . . . ." Id. § 1002(1); see, e.g., DAVID A. PRAr & SHARON REECE, ERISA AND EMPLOYEE
BENEFIT LAW: THE ESSENTIALS (2010).
5. See generally Wendy K. Mariner, Social Solidarity and Personal Responsibility in Health
Reform, 14 CONN. INS. L.J. 199 (2008) (identifying benefits of additional personal responsibil-
ity and its problems).
6. See, e.g.,Justin Hurwitz, Indexing Health Insurance to Marginal Health Status: A Spoonful
of Economics Helps the Premiums Go Down, 12 DEPAUL J. HEALTH GARE L. 43, 56-57 (2009)
(arguing for measuring individuals' care for their health by an index and using it to allocate
health coverage to those who cared for their health).
7. See, e.g., Avraham, supra note I (proposing insurer clearinghouses that would induce
insurers to take a longer-term outlook compared to the prevalent three-year horizon).
8. See, e.g., Laura D. Hermer, Private Health Insurance in the United States: A Proposalfor a
More Functional System, 6 Hous. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 1, 5-6, 82-84 (2005) (proposing con-
sumer cooperatives).
WINTER 2013]
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
A. Moral Hazard
Moral hazard refers to the change of an insured's conduct due to
the insurance contract's reduction of the risk the insured bears.9 An
insured has a reduced incentive to avoid risks and an increased in-
centive to take more risks, whereas when uninsured had the full
incentive to avoid risks. For example, consider a homeowner who
obtains insurance against fire. Does our homeowner oversee fire-
places, barbecues, ashtrays and stoves with the same intensity as
before the insurance?10 Does the ship-owner who obtains insurance
navigate with the same care as before insurance?1 1 We are suscepti-
ble to incentives. 12 Therefore, some reduction of care must be
expected.
Insurers, of course, are sensitive to moral hazard in the design of
insurance contracts. Terms of insurance contracts that address
moral hazard include deductibles, exclusions of coverage for spe-
cific causes, and adjustments of premiums to reflect increased risk
associated with certain types of conduct.
1 3
In health insurance, a much-discussed expression of moral haz-
ard is the tendency to visit doctors more. This is akin to a bias
toward hypochondriac behavior and creates excessive consumption
of care. Research addresses the question of how deductibles pre-
vent excessive care.' 4 That version of moral hazard, however, does
not relate to this Essay's proposal.
9. See Liran Einav & Amy Finkelstein, Selection in Insurance Markets: Theory and Empirics in
Pictures, 25J. EcoN. PERSP. 115, 129-36 (2011).
10. The conventional wisdo, is of course not. See, e.g., Everett U. Crosby, Fire Prevention,
26 ANNALS Am. AcAD. POL. & Soc. Sci. 224, 226 (1905) ("The record of fire losses has clearly
shown that moral hazard is frequently found .. ").
11. See, e.g., SAMUEL PLIMSOLL, OUR SEAMEN 23 (1873) (reporting that before the advent
of insurance, legislation was not needed to prevent excess loading of ships).
12. Whereas incentives may not fully explain any individual's choices, they undeniably
have an effect in the aggregate, as we see from decades of studies. See, e.g., Isaac Ehrlich &
Gary S. Becker, Market Insurance, Self-Insurance, and Self-Protection, 80J. POL. ECON. 623 (1972)
(analyzing insurance as a substitute for self-protection). See generally GARY S. BECKER, A TREA-
TISE ON THE FAMILY (1991) (showing that incentives influence life decisions even in non-
financial areas such as marriage, reproduction, and divorce).
13. See, e.g., Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. State Farm Auto. Ins. Co., 277 A.2d 603, 608 (Md.
1971) (identifying insurance clauses designed to protect insurers from moral hazard); Alan
D. Miller & Ronen Perry, The Reasonable Person, 87 N.Y.U. L. REv. 323, 343-44 & n.86 (2012)
(discussing contractual terms that alleviate moral hazard); David M. Cutler et al., Selection
Stories: Understanding Movement Across Health Plans, (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 15164, 2009) (explaining how insurance companies have developed strategies
against moral hazard).
14. See, e.g., M. Kate Bundorf et al., Health Risk Income, and Employment-Based Health Insur-
ance, 13 F. HEALTH ECON. & POL'Y 1 (2010) (describing how insurers use deductibles to deter
excessive claims).
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A more relevant facet of moral hazard is the level of preventive
care. The moral hazard analysis argues that the presence of health
insurance reduces the incentive to prevent disease, and some evi-
dence supports this conclusion. For example, one study finds that
individuals at risk for diabetes exercise somewhat less if insured.1"
This implies that as the U.S. moves toward universal coverage, pre-
vention is likely to slightly decline, intensifying the need to motivate
health insurers to adopt this Essay's proposal.
B. Adverse Selection
Adverse selection refers to the tendency for high-risk individuals
to opt into more comprehensive insurance plans and low-risk indi-
viduals to opt out of them. Candidates for insurance who are in
poor health and are therefore at high risk of consuming healthcare
are more likely to purchase insurance than their healthier, low-risk
counterparts. Because of a potential information asymmetry about
health status among insurers and the insured,, insurers cannot al-
ways identify the high-risk individuals and price premiums accord-
ingly.16 Adverse selection can cause a death spiral that destroys the
insurance market. The departure of each low-risk group causes the
insurers to raise premiums and the market to contract, successively
excluding the next-lowest risks, perhaps to extinction. 17 The oppo-
site phenomenon, advantageous selection or propitious selection,
can also appear, as it does in supplemental insurance that tends to
appeal to the more educated and healthier segments of the
population.
18
Chronic diseases make the potential for adverse selection espe-
cially pronounced in health insurance. Individuals already bearing
a chronic disease produce an insurance paradox. The expenditure
for the care of their existing disease is not an unknown risk but a
certainty. In an environment of private insurance, insurers will balk
15. Betty T. Tao, The Impact of Insurance on Recommended Medical Care, Lifestyle Behaviors
and the Health of Non-Elderly Diabetics, UNrv. N.C., 17-22 (Nov. 29, 2006), http://www.unc.
edu/the/archives/tao.pdf.
16. See Peter Siegelman, Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: An Exaggerated Threat, 113
YALE L.J. 1223, 1223-24 (2004).
17. Consider the recounting of such a death spiral by David M. Cutler & Richard J.
Zeckhauser, Adverse Selection in Health Insurance, 1 FRONTrIERS IN HEALTH POL'Y REs. 1, 11-14
(1998) (describing how when Harvard University offered a cheaper plan that attracted the
healthier members of the pool away from the traditional plan, the traditional plan eventually
had to be abandoned).
18. Jonneke Bolhaar et al., A Dynamic Analysis of the Demand for Health Insurance and
Health Care, 56 EUR. ECON. REV. 669 (2012), available at http://personal.vu.nl/b.vander.
klaauw/healthinsurance.pdf.
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at covering inescapable expenses under the same terms as probabil-
istic risks. In jurisdictions without universal coverage, chronic dis-
ease produces the ultimate expression of adverse selection. Those
with chronic disease may have expected costs that exceed the
premiums the insurers offer, thus making the extension of coverage
to them a losing proposition for the insurer. The transition to uni-
versal coverage seems problematic, because a disproportionately
large fraction of the uninsured would be expected to have chronic
diseases. In an established regime of universal coverage, chronic
diseases are less of a problem because everyone must have insur-
ance before and after the onset of the chronic disease. Universal
coverage, however, does not necessarily eliminate adverse selection.
For example, those who develop chronic conditions may still have a
stronger incentive to increase their coverage compared to those
who do not.
State law tends to follow a bifurcated approach to the adverse-
selection problem posed by chronic diseases. Most states give insur-
ers a grace period in individual insurance contracts, during which
they need not provide coverage for preexisting conditions. 19 More
importantly, insurers may condition the offering of individual in-
surance contracts on a health exam, which may enable them not to
avoid covering those with preexisting conditions.20 Denials on the
ground of preexisting conditions are typically prohibited for group
policies offered through employers, although the new policies may
avoid coverage of preexisting conditions temporarily.21 Thus, insur-
ers may avoid offering individual policies to those with preexisting
19. For example, Indiana Code provides:
The benefits provided by: (1) an individual policy of accident and sickness insurance;
or (2) a certificate of coverage that is issued under a nonemployer based association
group policy of accident and sickness insurance to an individual who is a resident of
Indiana; may not be excluded, limited, or denied for more than twelve (12) months
after the effective date of the coverage because of a preexisting condition of the
individual.
IND. CODE ANN. § 27-8-5-2.5(b) (West 2008); see also N.Y. INS. LAw § 3232(b) (McKinney
Supp. 2012) (a preexisting condition provision in any health-insurance contract may not
exclude coverage for more than twelve months).
20. See, e.g., Individual Major Medical Insurance: Applying for an Individual Major Medical
Insurance Policy, ILL. DEP'T OF INS., http://insurance.illinois.gov/Healthlnsurance/IndMaj-
MedIns.asp (last visited Feb. 16, 2012) ("Companies frequently request medical records and
may require you to take a physical exam or have blood tests."); Individual Health Plans: Fre-
quently Asked Questions: 2.1, TEX. DEP'T OF INS., http://www.texashealthoptions.com/cp2/faq.
html#2.1 (last visited Feb. 16, 2012) ("With an individual policy, you may be required to
undergo a physical or a health screening ....").
21. See, e.g., CAL. INS. CODE § 12682 (West 2005) (providing that the "policy shall not
exclude, as a preexisting condition, any condition covered by the group policy"); IND. CODE
ANN. § 27-8-15-34.1 (West 2003) ("[A] small employer insurer must: (1) offer to any small
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conditions but must offer coverage if the same individuals work for
an employer who offers a group plan. Massachusetts has a universal
insurance mandate that requires the coverage of preexisting condi-
tions in both individual and group policies.22 Recent U.S. federal
health care reform adopts the same model, calling the obligation to
cover preexisting disease a "guaranteed issue."
II. THE INCENTIVE STRUCTURE OF HEALTH INSURANCE
Health insurance treats chronic disease in an unusual way. Effec-
tively, health insurance does not provide full coverage for chronic
diseases. Rather, health insurance provides temporary coverage
only during the current insurance relation, the current term, and
its renewals. To observe this effect, contrast the insurance of assets,
known as property and casualty insurance.
Property and casualty insurance addresses risks to a specific piece
of property, such as a house, car, or boat. If a risk materializes and
harms that asset, the insurer will repair or replace the asset (subject
to any deductibles, coinsurance, or other terms). Thus, the insurer
bears the entirety of the risk of harm during the term of the insur-
ance contract. For the insurer to expect to stay in business, the pre-
mium must equal or exceed the probability-adjusted harm. The
probability-adjusted harm is the sum of the product of each
probability that the asset will suffer each possible harm during the
term of the contract multiplied by the cost of the corresponding
repair of the asset or its replacement.
23
Chronic disease shows that this model does not apply to health
insurance. Granted, the insured's health may be damaged in a fully
curable way, as in the case of a curable infection. However, the exis-
tence of chronic disease means that irreparable deteriorations of
employer all products that are approved for sale in the small group market and that the
insurer is actively marketing; and (2) accept any employer that applies for any of those prod-
ucts."); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3924.03 (LexisNexis 2010) ("[Hlealth benefit plans covering
small employers are subject to the following conditions, as applicable: . . (C) A carrier shall
not exclude any eligible employee or dependent, who would otherwise be covered under a
health benefit plan, on the basis of any actual or expected health condition of the employee
or dependent."). All states must now require group insurers to guarantee issue. Medical ex-
ams, if conducted, can only be used to identify pre-existing conditions, not to deny coverage.
See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg(a)(1)-(4) (2010).
22. See 830 MASs. CODE REGS. § 111M.2.1(5) (2012) (failure to maintain coverage may
be subject to a penalty under MASS. GEN. LAws ch. HIM, § 2 (2012)).
23. See S. DAVID PROMISLOW, FUNDAMENTALS OF AcruAmoAL MATHEMATICS 261 (2011) (dis-
cussing the mathematics of property and casualty insurance). Formally, let all possible harm-
ful events i have harms hi and their corresponding probabilities pi. The premium must
exceed the sum .
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health exist. Chronic diseases require continued treatment that will
exceed the term of the insurance contract. The role of the health
insurance contract in those cases becomes covering ongoing treat-
ment but only during the term of the insurance contract.
Compare this setting to insuring a house or car. The insurance of
each successive year is unrelated to that of the previous year. The
insurer who will cover the damage due to a fire or a crash will de-
pend only on the time period when the harm occurred. In health
insurance, the damage from a chronic disease will span many years,
perhaps burdening several different insurers and eventually Medi-
care, which provides care in one's later years.
The two settings create different incentives. Property insurers
shoulder the risk of destruction and have the full incentive to pre-
vent it (and induce the insured to prevent it). Health insurers know
that they will likely pass part of the cost of chronic diseases to subse-
quent insurers and eventually Medicare so they do not have the full
incentive to prevent chronic disease. The incentives of health insur-
ers are closer to those of a manufacturer providing a short-term
warranty rather than those of a casualty insurer. A manufacturer
who provides a warranty has the incentive to make the repairs that
will merely outlast the warranty period but not to restore the item
to its new condition. Health insurers have similarly shortsighted in-
centives. Health insurers have the incentive to maintain the func-
tional health of the insured, but only during their period of
coverage, and do not have the incentive to make the large expenses
that cure or altogether prevent future illness.
This shortfall of incentives exists for any long-term investment in
care by the insurer, as previous analysis has shown.2 4 For the insurer
to recover the cost of the investment, the insurer must continue to
receive premiums from those (of the insured) whose diseases were
prevented. To wit, if a disease is likely to occur to half the members
of a group and a costly prevention makes it only occur to a quarter
of its members, then the cost of that prevention must be recouped
from the premiums of the still-healthy members who would have
gotten the disease-the quarter of the group whose disease was pre-
vented. Because the incidence of disease is mostly probabilistic, the
individual members of the group who, without the prevention,
would have gotten the disease are impossible to identify. Therefore,
no easy solution exists that would restore the insurer's incentives to
make long-term preventive expenditures.
24. See Avraham, supra note I (proposing insurer clearinghouses that would a induce
longer-term outlook among insurers compared to the prevalent three-year horizon).
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The importance of this difference becomes evident when asking
how to redesign the health insurance contract to fully cover the cost
of the onset of chronic disease. The problem is open to various
avenues of analysis.
The cost of the onset of chronic disease must include the entire
cost of care for the disease. If the model under which we approach
the payment of premiums assumes annual premiums, then the in-
surer bears the full cost of onset only if (i) the insurer will continue
to cover the expenses of disease for the rest of the patient's life and
(ii) cannot increase the premium in reaction to the onset. From
this perspective, the only insurer in the U.S. market who fully bears
the risk of the onset of chronic disease is Medicare. (As a govern-
mental entity, it is subject to the many imperfections that public
choice theory identifies.) For example, consider that obesity may
lead to diabetes with some probability per year and diabetes care
involves a significant annual cost, but that Medicare covers all indi-
viduals from age sixty-five. An insurer of a sixty-year-old obese per-
son knows that from age sixty-five it will not be liable for this
person's health expenses. Thus, the insurer is only concerned with
the probability of whether this person develops diabetes over the
next five years, rather than over the person's lifetime. This insurer
would break even by charging a group of such individuals for the
probability of developing diabetes and assume care only for the
next five years.25 Medicare, as an insurer, will bear the expense of
diabetes after age sixty-five regardless of when the illness arises.
Thus, Medicare already has an interest in preventing diabetes long
before it becomes the insurer. Only if the original insurer contin-
ued to owe this insured's lifetime coverage with no right to raise
premiums would the insurer bear the full incentive to prevent
diabetes.2 6
25. To make the example concrete, suppose that diabetes care costs $10,000 per year,
and obesity increases the incidence of diabetes by five per one hundred people per year, so
that five (more) of every one hundred obese people insured manifest diabetes each year
(than would otherwise). An insurer of 100,000 obese sixty-year-olds expects 5,000 additional
incidences of obesity per year for the next five years. The expected extra expense the first
year is $50 million-the product of spending $10,000 on the first 5,000 incidences. The sec-
ond year, an additional $50 million of claims will materialize, for a total of $100 million. The
third year will see claims of $150 million, the fourth of $200 million, and the fifth of $250
million. Then the entire cohort obtains Medicare coverage. The insurer breaks even by
charging the obese group a total of $50+100+150+200+250 million, or $750 million. Divided
over five years and 100,000 insured people, the annual premium component for this risk is
$1,500. When the cohort joins Medicare, and an additional 5,000 incidences arise during
that first year, the Medicare expenditure per obese individual for the extra diabetes will be
$3,000 for the first year only.
26. Continuing the concrete example of the prior footnote, if this cohort has a life ex-
pectancy of seventy years, then the insurer must establish this group's additional premium so
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An approach that is more abstract but also more appropriate
from the perspective of probability theory would be to assume that
health insurance contracts involve a single premium payment and
last for the insured's lifetime, rather than have periodic payments
for renewable terms. A lifetime insurer would bear the full cost of
onset because the insurer would continue to provide coverage until
death.
As unrealistic as the idea of a single lifelong insurance contract
may be, it transfers to the insurer the risks of disease without the
distortions created by the interaction of chronic diseases with re-
newable insurance terms. Unlike insurers under term contracts,
who know that Medicare will eventually assume coverage of chronic
disease, the lifetime insurer bears the risk of chronic diseases in the
same way as that of curable diseases. Whereas the onset of chronic
disease produces adverse selection in term contracts, lifetime cover-
age precludes questions of changes of generosity of coverage, of
departure from the pool, or introduction to the pool.
III. AVENUES FOR IMPROVEMENT
Pursuing the theoretical ideal must not stop at recognizing that it
is unrealistic. The goal should be exploring avenues for approach-
ing the ideal. The features of the ideal insurance scheme would
need to increase the exposure of insurers to chronic disease. The
next paragraphs discuss a few of the possible options: the extension
of insurance terms, insurer clearinghouses, and the statistically cor-
rect compensation of prior insurers for averted disease.
A. Longer Insurance Terms
An additional improvement, though perhaps trivial, would be a
mandate or simply an incentive for longer insurance terms. Longer
terms would reduce the magnitude of the expectation that chronic
disease claimants will move to a subsequent insurer. Changing the
duration of insurance terms from one year to ten years or longer
might significantly improve current incentives. For such a proposal
that the insurer can pay for a sequence of claims from this cohort that start at $50 million
and increase by $50 million per year over ten years, going from $50 to $500 million. The
annual premium must be $2,750 (i.e., the first and tenth years' expenditures aggregate to
$550 million as do the other pairs, thus the calculation is five times $550 million divided by
100,000 insured people over ten years). Contrast this with the above-mentioned premium of
$1,500, which lets the insurer break even when Medicare takes over the cohort at age sixty-
five.
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to become realizable, the insurance environment would need to ad-
dress adaptability to changes in the lives of the insured so that mar-
riages, relocations, changes of employers, and similar shifts do not
disrupt the longer insurance contracts.
B. Insurer Clearinghouses
A prior analysis of this problem proposed that insurers form
clearinghouses.2 7 Although the detailed specifications of the clear-
inghouses are still open, their function would be to reimburse a
prior insurer for an expenditure that produces long-term benefits.
For example, an insurer who covers an expenditure that reduces
the onset probability of a disease by an amount that amortizes the
expenditure in a few years would be entitled to receive compensa-
tion from the clearinghouse if the insured changed to a new in-
surer soon after the procedure. This compensation would
encourage insurers to make longer-term calculations.
Drawbacks of clearinghouses include that they present adminis-
trative difficulties, may raise antitrust issues, and do not foster inno-
vation. Insurance clearinghouses would be associations of
competitors. Thus, they would increase the dangers of collusion
that antitrust law seeks to minimize. Also, the clearinghouse would
need a process to determine which procedures to reimburse and
the brevity of the period during which it would compensate insur-
ers for a switch of the insured to a new insurer. Determining these
system features is not intuitive.
More importantly, the clearinghouse would determine which ex-
penditures qualify for reimbursement. Thus, the incentive to main-
tain the health of the insured would not be generated by the
relationship between insured and insurer but by the clearinghouse,
which would transfer that incentive to the insurer. Hence, the in-
surer would not have the incentive to innovate in reducing onset
probabilities. Innovations would only be reimbursed after the
clearinghouse adopted them. The importance of innovations
should need no stressing.
28
27. See Avraham, supra note 1.
28. Let us return to the example of gastric bypass. Insurers lacked the incentive to in-
duce their insured to undergo the procedure. If insurers were fully incentivized to encourage
the insured to have gastric bypasses, what would be the reduction in cases of diabetes? How
many other procedures would be developed? The importance of innovation is illustrated
most vividly in industries that have ceased to be heavily regulated, such as air travel and
telephone service, where reduced regulation not only increased competition but also in-
creased customization, organization, and types of offerings, such as tighter airplane and gate
management, frequent flier miles, and calling plans.
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C. Statistically Correct Compensation
The last alternative presented here is statistically correct compen-
sation of the insurer for the chronic disease averted during the in-
surer's tenure. The next paragraphs describe the proposal and the
next Part offers an illustration of such a calculation.
The social harm from debilitative disease tends to exceed the
cost of its treatment because the cost of the disease includes all the
individual's suffering and lost productivity. Thus, insurers who
prevent disease should arguably have a stronger incentive than
economizing the avoided treatment expenses. Nevertheless, the in-
dustry structure of a sequence of insurers that receive only current
premiums does not compensate insurers for the avoided expenses
after the relationship with an insured ends. Insurers entitled to re-
ceive the treatment expenses that they averted will have a fuller in-
centive to take long-term measures of prevention and to support
innovation in preventive health. Insurers should be entitled to a fee
for avoided chronic expenses (FACE), a fee that would compensate in-
surers for the future chronic disease expenses that did not material-
ize during the period of coverage by the insurer. The fee would be
ongoing and end with the cure of the relevant disease or the co-
hort's death, adjusting for aggravations of health and changes of
the insured cohort's choices about coverage.
While not easy, calculating averted treatment costs is nonetheless
possible. Determining avoided expenses requires the baseline ex-
pectation of occurrence. This compares the occurrence of chronic
disease in the beginning of each age segment or cohort to its end.
The objective is to determine the expected incidence of the disease
in every age range. An insurer who experiences increases of disease
that are smaller than expected should be entitled to the expendi-
tures this pool of insured will avoid.
To calculate the fee, consider that for some period one insurer
provides coverage to a group of insured from a single age cohort.
Compare the incidence of the disease in this group at the begin-
ning of that period to its end. If the incidence increased as ex-
pected, then this insurer has not averted disease. If the incidence of
disease increased less than expected, then the insurer deserves
credit for averting disease, whether intentionally or not. The in-
surer should continue to participate in the benefit flowing from the
lower incidence of the disease in that particular group, even if sub-
sequent insurers avert no more disease.
The healthy and the sick may be easy to identify. Much harder to
identify are those who would be sick but for preventive health mea-
sures. Even if identifying whose disease the insurer has averted is
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impossible, compensating the insurer for averted expenses is possi-
ble. The impossibility of identifying the individuals whose disease
was averted merely changes the specific charge to a proportional
charge on all the members of the group who remain healthy.
Note that the proposed fee corresponds to a windfall gain for
subsequent insurers that the current system produces. When a sub-
sequent insurer covers an unusually healthy cohort, the subsequent
insurer enjoys surprisingly few claims and, therefore, surprisingly
great profits. The proposed payment of averted chronic expenses to
prior insurers tends to correspond to the subsequent insurer's
windfall.
The financial details of the insurer's FACE claim depend on that
insurer's contract. Each insurer should be entitled to the expenses
that, according to that insurer's contract, would have been spent on
those who would have obtained the disease during this insurer's
coverage.
The proposed fee must address the phenomenon of the disease
accelerating to reach the expected incidence under a subsequent
insurer. Did the prior insurer merely postpone disease or truly avert
it? The initial insurer's interests are in conflict with those of the
subsequent insurers. The initial insurer will likely argue that the
subsequent acceleration is the subsequent insurers' fault, whereas
the subsequent insurers will likely argue that the initial insurer
merely postponed the disease. The initial policy position of the
FACE fee can temporarily sidestep the issue, consider that the sub-
sequent insurer is not at fault, and end the payments to the initial
insurer. A more sophisticated next step might be to allow the initial
insurer to demonstrate fault by subsequent insurers. Changes in the
choice of coverage by the healthy pool also deserve attention. The
effect is different if the pool switches to less or more coverage.
If the unusually healthy cohort increases coverage, even after the
proposed fee, the subsequent insurer benefits. The fee for avoided
chronic expenses is calculated according to the prior insurer's
lesser coverage, whereas the subsequent insurer charges premiums
based on the expected disease under the more generous coverage.
Yet disease remains below expectations. The subsequent insurer's
actuarial model makes the insurer expect more disease than the
healthy cohort exhibits. The insured pool's choice to increase cov-
erage implies greater premium payments but the surprising rarity
of disease means the insurer spends surprisingly little on care. If the
pool had maintained the same coverage that it had with the prior
insurer, then the fee payable to the prior insurer would cancel out
the subsequent insurer's gain, and the increased coverage produces
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an overcompensation that favors the subsequent insurer. The sub-
sequent insurer's surprising gain is a result of the low incidence in
combination with the cohort's choice for more coverage. Although
initially this proposal may ignore this issue, the appropriate treat-
ment should increase the fee and apportion the gain between the
initial insurer and the subsequent one.
The opposite problem is clearest in its extreme, where all the
healthy discontinue their coverage, producing no premiums to be
shared with the prior insurer. Even if the healthy merely reduce
their coverage, then the subsequent insurer may not receive
enough premiums (after disease coverage) to cover the fee for the
prior insurer. To the extent this materializes as an issue, two poten-
tial solutions appear. Subsequent insurers could surcharge the
members of the unusually healthy cohort to compensate the previ-
ous insurer. Other insured would pay the basic premium. Members
of the unusually healthy cohort would pay a fee beyond the
premium for their (reduced) coverage. That fee would be the in-
cremental amount actuarially necessary to compensate the prior in-
surer. Subsequent insurers could, alternatively, have the right to
limit their payment to the prior insurer at the level justified by the
new premium. The latter approach is inferior, because it exposes
the prior insurer to adverse selection (since if the healthy reduce
their coverage, the prior insurer is undercompensated).
Some final points before visiting the illustration confirm that the
proposal maintains the insurers' incentives to cure disease and fur-
ther reduce it. A subsequent insurer who reduces the incidence of
the disease receives the full benefit from reducing the disease and
curing it. The incentive to continue averting disease exists because
the subsequent insurer is also entitled to a fee from subsequent in-
surers for further reductions of disease incidence.
The proposal does not interfere with the incentive to cure dis-
ease. Any insurer has the full incentive to cure disease. A new cure
does not produce an obligation to compensate a prior insurer. On
the contrary, the development of a cure would end the prior
insurer's right to a fee; a cure would end the expenditure. The
members of the prior insurer's cohort who would have developed
the disease would have received the cure. Therefore, that group's
expenditures would have ended, and the fee claim of the prior in-
surer ends. Notice that this does not reduce the incentive to cure
the disease. Developing a cure benefits the subsequent insurer by
ending the obligation. By contrast, the current regime does not
produce a full incentive to develop a cure, since without a cure the
insurer will evade some future expenses.
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IV. ILLUSTRATION OF AVERTED DIsEAsE
Assume a cohort of one thousand individuals insured by InitCo
from age thirty until age thirty-five. Suppose the expected diseased
incidence at age thirty is 4 percent and is 5 percent by age thirty-
five, corresponding to a 0.2 percent annual incidence. Care costs
$5,000 annually. This group of individuals should have forty indi-
viduals subject to the disease at its beginning and fifty at its end.
The expectation is that ten will obtain the disease during the five
years of coverage.
The same cohort's expected disease incidence from ages thirty-
five to eighty-five will go from 5 percent to 15 percent, resulting in
an additional one hundred individuals obtaining the disease during
the next fifty years, increasing by 0.2 percent annually. Suppose that
all the members of this pool, upon reaching age 35, switch their
coverage away from InitCo.
Calculating the actuarially correct incremental annual premium
of InitCo starts with the number of expected diseased, forty. Multi-
ply that by the cost of their annual care, $5,000. The result,
$200,000, is the expected annual expenditure of InitCo on the ini-
tially diseased members of its pool if the incidence did not increase.
Over the five years of the period, that expenditure equals $1 mil-
lion. Since InitCo expects ten new individuals to join the ranks of
the diseased over the five-year period, that would correspond to ex-
pected coverage for two and a half years, or $12,500, for a total for
the ten individuals of $125,000. Thus, the aggregate expected ex-
penditure by InitCo over the five years is $1,125,000. Spread over
the one thousand individuals, this implies a premium of $1,125 per
person for the five-year period. Divided over the five years, the an-
nual premium that InitCo should charge is $225.
A. Social Gain
Suppose that this insurer, InitCo, causes the disease's prevalence
rate to slow during the period it provided coverage. Instead of this
cohort's disease prevalence increasing from 4 percent to 5 percent,
it increases from 4 percent to 4.5 percent. Instead of ten new in-
sured people who manifest the disease, only five do. First, observe
that the short term of the coverage does not give the initial insurer
the full incentive for long-term disease reduction. Suppose that
those five insured whose disease did not occur have absolutely
avoided the disease, so its occurrence will thereafter continue to be
five insured, or 0.5 percent below expectations in this pool.
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Assume individuals live to age eighty-five. The five averted dis-
eases would have occurred on average at age 32.5. The average du-
ration of averted disease is 52.5 years. Since the annual cost of the
disease is $5,000, the total averted expenditure is $1,312,500 (the
product of multiplying five by 52.5 and by 5,000).
Compare this to the financial benefit of the insurer on whose
term the disease was averted. This pool is insured with InitCo for
five years. The five individuals whose disease was averted have aver-
age disease duration of 2.5 years, for a total averted expense of
$62,500 (the product of multiplying five by 2.5 and by 5,000).
The insurer saves under $63,000 by averting disease in these five
insured, whereas society has gains well over $1.25 million from dis-
ease avoidance. The more than twenty-fold deficiency in the invest-
ment incentives is striking even when focusing on a disease without
a high cost of care and a term of insurance longer than the average
of under four years.
B. Fee Calculation
Suppose that the proposed regime of statistically correct com-
pensation were in force when the pool changed insurers at age
thirty-five. Subsequent insurers who cover the surprisingly healthy
pool pay the fee for averted chronic expenses (FACE) to InitCo.
That fee is equivalent to the averted disease expenditures that
would have been covered by InitCo.
For simplicity, assume a single subsequent insurer. Whether we
partition the subsequent contracts in shorter terms or a single term,
the result is the same. Assume, therefore, SeqCo covers this pool
from age thirty-five to the terminal age of eighty-five. Disease will
again expand by ten individuals every five years, or 0.2 percent per
year, with the same cost of $5,000. The only difference from the
previous calculation of aggregate social averted expenses is that cov-
erage by SeqCo begins at age thirty-five. SeCo provides coverage for
fifty years to the forty-five people already diseased at the beginning
of coverage and does not have to spend for fifty years the annual
$5,000 cost of care on the five individuals whose disease was
averted. Thus, the averted disease expenditure is $1.25 million (the
product of multiplying five by fifty and by 5,000). Adding the incen-
tive of InitCo shows that this scheme gives InitCo the full monetary
gains from averting the disease.
Notice that the FACE fee per insured per year is trivially small-
this is truly a modest proposal. Dividing the $1.25 million saved by
SeqCo over the fifty additional years one thousand insureds remain
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in the pool indicates that the fee per insured per year is $25. Thus,
even if the pool is dispersed and receives coverage by several insur-
ers, InitCo should be entitled to $25 per year per insured from each
subsequent insurer.
CONCLUSION
This Essay analyzed the mismatch between the need for long-
term prevention of the onset of chronic disease and the reality of
annual insurance contracts that reduce the prevention incentives of
the insured without fully placing them on insurers. Three avenues
for improvements were discussed: longer term insurance, insurer
clearinghouses, and prior insurers' entitlement to the statistically
correct fee for avoided expenses after the end of that insurer's term
(the fee for averted chronic expenses, or FACE). The most appeal-
ing seems to be the last: if prior insurers had the right to a fee for
the disease they prevented, then the prior insurer would have a
fuller incentive to reduce the probability of its onset. The change
gives the full incentives to innovate and prevent disease without sig-
nificant administrative complexity or changes in the insurance
infrastructure.
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